Experimental Verification of Adverse Selection Models
Abstract
Modern microeconomics describes the behavior of market agents in the economy with asymmetric information, uncertainty, and risk. Many theoretical models devoted to adverse selection, moral hazard, opportunistic behavior, etc. have appeared during the last 30–40 years. At the same time, we still face an acute problem of experimental verifi cation of results and conclusions obtained by the theoretical analysis of classic models. It was found out that not all the results received from those models had been confi rmed during laboratory experiments.
Keywords:
design of revelation mechanisms, experimental economics, constant absolute risk aversion, insurance markets, adverse selection, binary lottery, expected utility
Downloads
Download data is not yet available.
References
Литература на русском языке
Деньгов В. В. Теория контрактов: достижения и проблемы на пути к новой экономической парадигме. СПб., 2006. С. 1–250.
Коуэлл Ф. Микроэкономика. Принципы и анализ: учебник / пер. с англ. М., 2011.
References in Latin Alphabet
Abbring J. H., Chiappori P-A., Heckman J., Pinquet J. Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in insurance: Can Dynamic Data Help to Distinguish?// Journal of the European Economic Association. 2003. April-May. P. 512–521.
Akerlof G. A. The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1970. Vol. 84. P. 488–500 (Русск. перевод: Акерлоф Дж. Рынок лимонов: неопределенность качества и рыночный механизм // THESIS. 1994. Вып. 5. С. 91–104).
Baker T. Containing the Promise of Insurance: Adverse Selection and Risk Classification// University of Connecticut School of Law Articles and Working Papers. 2001. Paper 3. P. 1–18.
Browne M. Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Individual Health Insurance Market // Journal of Risk and Insurance. 1992. N 59. P. 13–33.
Cardon J., Hendel I. Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence From the National Health Expenditure Survey, mimeo. Princeton: Princeton University, 1998.
Chiappori P. A., Durand F., Geoffard P. Y. Moral Hazard and the Demand for Physician Services: First Lessons from a French Natural Experiment // European Economic Revie. 1998. N 42. P. 499–511.
Chiappori P. A., Salanie B. Empirical Contract Theory: The Case of Insurance Data // European Economic Review. 1997. N 41. P. 943–951.
Chiappori P. A., Salanie B. Testing Contract Theory: A Survey of Some Recent Work // In Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications. Eight World Congress of the Econometric Society. Econometric Society Monographs / ed. by M. Dewatripoint, L. P. Hansen, S. Turnovsky. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Vol. 1. Ch. 4. P. 115–149.
Chiappori P. A., Salanie B. Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets // Journal of Political Economy. 2000. N 108. P. 56–78.
Cohen A., Siegelman P. Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets // Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association. 2010. Vol. 77(1). Р. 39–84.
Cutler D. M., Reber S. J. Paying for Health Insurance: the Trade-off between Competition and Adverse Selection // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1998. Vol. 113. P. 433–466.
Cutler D., Zeckhauser R. Adverse Selection in Health Insurance// National Bureau of Economic Research. 1997. July. Working Paper 6107. P. 1–46. URL: http://www.nber.org/papers/w6107.pdf?new_window=1 (дата обращения: 06.03.2011).
Dionne G., Gourieroux C., Vanasse C. Testing for Evidence of Adverse Selection in the Automobile Insurance Market: A Comment // Journal of Political Economy. 2001. Vol. 109. Р. 444–455.
Dionne G., Vanasse C. Automobile Insurance Ratemaking in the Presence of Asymmetrical Information // Journal of Applied Econometrics. 1992. N 7. P. 149–165.
Finkelstein A., Poterba J. Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder Evidence from the U. K. annuity Market // Harvard University and NBER. 2002. P. 1–32. URL: http://econwww.mit.edu/files/775 (дата обращения: 06.03.2011).
Hende I., Lizzeri A. The Role of Commitment in Dynamic Contracts: Evidence from Life Insurance // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 2003. Vol. 118. P. 299–327.
Holly A., Gardiol L., Domenighetti G., Bisig B. An Econometric Model of Health Care Utilization and Health Insurance in Switzerland // European Economic Review. 1998. N 42. P. 513–522.
Hun Seog S., Chang Mo Kang. Equilibrium at the Insurance Market with Adverse Selection and Fraud, July 2007. URL: http://www.aria.org/meetings/2007papers/IVA%20-%202%20-%20Kang.pdf (дата обращения: 23.01.2011).
Karagoyozova T., Siegelman P. Is there Propitious Selection in Insurance Markets? // University of Connecticut. 2006. Economics Working Papers. Paper 200620. P. 1–41. URL: http://digitalcommons.uconn.edu/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1022&context=econ_wpapers (дата обращения: 06.03.2011).
Kreps D. M. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton Univ. Press, 1990. P. 661–675.
Landsberger M., Meilijson I. Monopoly Insurance under Adverse Selection when Agents Differ in Risk Aversion // Journal of Economic Theory. 1994. N 63. P. 392–407.
Puelz R., Snow A. Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signalling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market // Journal of Political Economy. 1994. N 102. P. 236–257.16.
Riahi D., Levy-Garboua L., Montmarquette C. Competitive Insurance Markets and Adverse Selection in the Lab // CIRANO Working Paper. Scientific Series. Montreal, 2010s-34. P. 1–29.
Richaudeau D. Automobile Insurance Contracts and Risk of Accident: An Empirical Test Using French Individual Data // The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance Theory. 1999. N 24. P. 97–114.
Rothscild M., Stiglitz J. E. Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay in the Economics of Imperfect Information // Quarterly Journal of Economics. 1976. Vol. 80. P. 629–649.
Salanie B. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. MIT Press, 1997. P. 47−52.
Siegelman P. Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: an Exaggerated Threat // The Yale Law Journal. 2004. Р. 1223–1284.
Smart M. Competitive Insurance Markets with Two Unobservables // International Economic Review. 2000. N 41. P. 153–169.
Stiglitz J. Monopoly, Nonlinear Pricing and Imperfect Information: The Insurance Market// Review of Economic Studies. 1977. Vol. 44. P. 407–430.
URL: //ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9%D0%A3%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0 (дата обращения: 04.03.2011).
URL: //www.machinelearning.ru/wiki/index.php?title=%D0%9A%D1%80%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B9_%D0%A3%D0%B8%D0%BB%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BA%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%9C%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%A3%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%BD%D0%.B8 (дата обращения: 04.03.2011).
URL: http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/ viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&context=uconn_wps (дата обращения: 06.03.2011).
URL: http://www.iew.uzh.ch/ztree/ index.php (дата обращения: 04.03.2011).
URL: www.statsoft.ru/home/portal/applications/medicine/manna_uitni.htm (дата обращения: 04.03.2011).
Wilson C. A Model of Insurance Market with Incomplete Information// Journal of Economic Theory. 1977. N 16. P. 167–207.
Wilson C. The Nature of Equilibrium in Markets with Adverse Selection// Bell Journal of Economics. 1980. N 11. P. 108–130.
Translation of references in Russian into English
Downloads
Published
2011-09-30
How to Cite
Деньгов, В. В., & Мельникова, Е. П. (2011). Experimental Verification of Adverse Selection Models. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, (3), 031–041. Retrieved from https://economicsjournal.spbu.ru/article/view/2885
Issue
Section
Economic theory in historical development
License
Articles of the St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
