A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation
Abstract
In the present paper, a criterion for political integration based on individual rationality which reflects basic fairness concepts going back to Rawls and Wicksell is derived. This general criterion is then used to specify major determinants that affect the decision by a group of countries to enter a coalition. Finally, these considerations are confronted with actual behaviour of countries in the Kyoto process leading to the discussion of possible improvements for global climate-change policy.
Keywords:
John Rawls
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Литература на русском языке
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Translation of references in Russian into English
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Published
2008-06-30
How to Cite
Бухгольц, В., & Петерс, В. (2008). A Rawlsian Approach to International Cooperation. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, (2), 063–079. Retrieved from https://economicsjournal.spbu.ru/article/view/4058
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Section
Global economy
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Articles of the St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.
