The moving and mimetic world of credit rating agencies in search justice and equilibrium

Authors

  • Jean-Guy Degos University of Bordeaux, Research Centre IRGO, 35, Avenue Abadie, 33072, Bordeaux Cedex, France

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.21638/10.21638/11701/spbu05.2017.204

Abstract

After recalling quickly the origin of credit rating agencies, their initial atomistic structure, their evolu­tion in oligopoly, and their changing economic model from the investor-pays model to the issuer-pays model, we study the emergence of non-financial agencies, related to sustainable development. We also find that more and more financial support agencies are questionable foreign policies. This fact gave rise to Russian and Chinese agencies, which have different approaches to the markets, and we wonder if it is possible to have more justice and more balance in the increasingly important notation local financial entities, national and international. To present these analyses, we use the institutional and neo-institutional theories, as well as the theory of context, and that of mimetic desire.

Keywords:

credit rating agency, rating, issuer-pays model, investor-pays model, duopoly–oligopoly, Rene Girard's theory of mimetic desire

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References


References

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Published

2017-06-30

How to Cite

Degos, J.-G. (2017). The moving and mimetic world of credit rating agencies in search justice and equilibrium. St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies, 33(2), 269–281. https://doi.org/10.21638/10.21638/11701/spbu05.2017.204

Issue

Section

Financial markets