Application of Stochastic Cooperative Games in Investment Projects Evalution
Abstract
The paper considers one of the possible ways of implementing classical cooperative games with transferable utility. This way is based on the assumption, that the utility of coalitions (the value of the characteristic function of the game) are stochastic values. The given class of games is offered to be called stochastic cooperative games. The main attention is placed on liable approaches to the definition of superadditivity for stochastic cooperative games. Also possible approaches to the definition of concept of imputations and core for stochastic cooperative games are considered. One of the potential areas of practical using of stochastic cooperative games are economic researches of the investment projectprocesses, including projects with international participation.
Keywords:
game theory, large-scale investment projects, stochastic cooperative games, superadditivity, imputation
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Articles of the St Petersburg University Journal of Economic Studies are open access distributed under the terms of the License Agreement with Saint Petersburg State University, which permits to the authors unrestricted distribution and self-archiving free of charge.